

Some slides glued together for the cryptology seminar 2008

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University of Tartu / Cybernetica

Motivation

Protecting personal data

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- Every database containing such values in an identifiable form is a risk to our privacy
- Our goal is to build a better database

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- The standard solution is to password-protect the data
 - The data analyst will still see all the details
- Another idea is to introduce errors to the dataset
 - The privacy provided by this method is not provable
- Cryptographic techniques are looking promising

Share computing

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- In share computing, the processed data is stored in a secret-shared form
- Multi-party computation allows us to process shares

Intuition to secret sharing


the input secret

18

Intuition to secret sharing

the input secret

shares




Intuition to secret sharing

the input secret

shares

reconstructed value



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7

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9

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$$\begin{array}{r} + \quad \boxed{7} \\ \quad \boxed{24} \\ \hline \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{r} \boxed{2} \\ \boxed{50} \\ \hline \end{array} \quad \begin{array}{r} \boxed{9} \\ \boxed{29} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

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$$\begin{array}{r} \boxed{7} \\ + \boxed{24} \\ \hline \boxed{31} \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \end{array}$$

The diagram illustrates the homomorphic property of addition. It shows two equations: $18 = 7 + 2 + 9$ and $103 = 24 + 50 + 29$. The numbers 7, 2, 9, 24, 50, and 29 are each enclosed in a dashed rectangular box. A horizontal line is drawn below the first row of numbers. Below this line, the numbers 31, 52, and 38 are also enclosed in dashed boxes. The numbers 31, 52, and 38 are positioned directly below the boxes for 7, 24, and 29 respectively. The number 121 is enclosed in a dashed box and is positioned to the right of the number 38. The plus signs and equals sign are also present in the diagram, indicating the addition of the numbers in the second row to the numbers in the first row.

Introducing Sharemind

A privacy-preserving computer

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- Sharemind is a distributed virtual processor

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- Sharemind is a distributed virtual processor
- The processor performs share computing
 - the data is stored using the additive scheme
 - multi-party computation protocols are applied
- It is information-theoretically secure in a semi-honest model with three parties

Our innovation

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- The main design goal of Sharemind is performance
 - Sharemind performs best with larger input vectors and single operations are relatively slower
 - This is due to extensive vectorisation
- We also want it to be practically usable
 - Writing Sharemind applications is relatively easy

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
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 - determine if two values are equal


What can it compute?

- Sharemind can securely:
 - add or multiply two values
 - multiply a value by a constant
 - extract bits from a value
 - determine if two values are equal
 - determine the greater one of two values


What does it look like?



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Clients connect to miners




Executing instructions




Client

Virtual processor



Miner 1



Miner 2




Miner 3




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
Storage 1



Storage 2




Storage 3




Executing instructions

Virtual processor



Miner 1



Miner 2




Miner 3




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
Storage 1



Storage 2




Storage 3



Instr



Client



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
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
Executing instructions

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
Miner 1



Miner 2




Miner 3




Client

Storage


Storage 1



Storage 2




Storage 3




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
Miner 1



Miner 2




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
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
Storage 1



Storage 2





Storage 3



Executing instructions




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Virtual processor



Miner 1



Miner 2




Miner 3




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

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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
Client

Storage


Storage 1



Storage 2





Storage 3



Executing instructions



Client




Executing instructions




Client

Virtual processor

Miner 1



Miner 2



Miner 3



Storage

Storage 1



Storage 2




Storage 3




Executing instructions

Virtual processor


Miner 1



Miner 2




Miner 3




Client

Storage


Storage 1



Storage 2



Storage 3



From instructions to code

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- It follows directly that we can write programs that run on this processor

What needs to be done

n-party protocols for Sharemind

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- Expand Sharemind to support more than three parties.

n-party protocols for Sharemind

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- Listed on the webpage, but already taken.

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 - Java programming knowledge
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- Not an MSc topic. Not too tough.

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- Requires:
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 - understanding how the world works :)
- Possibly an MSc topic. Less theory, but a lot of work.

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- Choose, implement and profile some group of algorithms on Sharemind. Requires:
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- A thesis topic, if reaaally needed. Moderately tough.

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- Definitely an MSc topic. Moderately tough.

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- Find out what needs to be done to make the framework secure in the malicious model. Requires:
 - Advanced knowledge of cryptography and protocols.
 - C++ programming skills if you want to implement.
- Definitely an MSc topic. Quite hard work.

More info:

<http://sharemind.cs.ut.ee/>

Contact me.

db@ut.ee