**Abstract:** Quantum zero-knowledge proofs and quantum proofs of knowledge are inherently difficult
to analyze because their security analysis uses rewinding. Certain cases of quantum
rewinding are handled by the results by Watrous (SIAM J Comput, 2009) and Unruh
(Eurocrypt 2012), yet in general the problem remains elusive. We show that this
is not only due to a lack of proof techniques: relative to an oracle, we show
that classically secure proofs and proofs of knowledge are insecure in the quantum
setting.

More specifically, sigma-protocols, the Fiat-Shamir construction, and Fischlin's proof system are quantum insecure under assumptions that are sufficient for classical security. Additionally, we show that for similar reasons, computationally binding commitments provide almost no security guarantees in a quantum setting.

To show these results, we develop the "pick-one trick", a general technique that allows an adversary to find one value satisfying a given predicate, but not two.

**Permalink:** http://www.ut.ee/~unruh/publications/qpok-imposs.html