

Dependency-graph-based protocol analysis

bridge over the gap...

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(joint work with Ilja Tšahhirov)

Dependency graphs

- Directed graph, nodes are labeled with operations.
 - The label of a node determines its in-degree.
 - Incoming edges are (usually) ordered.
- Nodes of a DG compute values, purely functionally.
- Edges describe where the values are used for further computations.
- Special nodes are used to bring inputs to the system.
 - ... and transmit the outputs.

A protocol

- A wants to send the secret M to B .
- S is a trusted server.

$$A \longrightarrow B : A, B, \{N_A\}_{K_{AS}}$$


$$B \longrightarrow S : A, B, \{N_A\}_{K_{AS}}, \{N_B\}_{K_{BS}}$$

$$S \longrightarrow A : \{K_{AB}, N_A\}_{K_{AS}}$$

$$S \longrightarrow B : \{K_{AB}, N_B\}_{K_{BS}}$$


$$A \longrightarrow B : \{M\}_{K_{AB}}$$

A protocol




Generate keys K_{AS} and K_{BS}


A protocol



A protocol




A protocol




Party S

A protocol




Party S

A protocol




A protocol




Good sides

- The structure of definitions and uses of values is explicit.
 - No copying of values.
 - No variable names at all...
- We immediately see what is used where.
 - ... which greatly simplifies finding out whether some cryptographic reduction is allowed.
 - ... and also helps doing other simplifications.

Some obvious simplifications




Some obvious simplifications



We can do dead code elimination afterwards.


Some obvious simplifications




Simplifying encryption

- If the symmetric encryption is IND-CCA secure then we can replace the encryptions and decryptions as follows:
 - Encryptions — replace the plaintext with some constant 0.
 - Decryptions — replace them by
 - comparing the ciphertext with the results of all encryptions (with the same key);
 - if there is a match then take the corresponding (original) plaintext as the result;
 - if there is no match then fail.
- ... provided that the key is used only for encrypting and decrypting.

Which keys are OK?



Replace K_{BS}



Semantics

- Let $\{0, 1\}_{\perp}^* = \{\perp\} \cup \{0, 1\}^*$ where \perp is the smallest value and everything else is incomparable.
- Let $\mathbb{B} = \{\text{false}, \text{true}\}$ with $\text{false} \leq \text{true}$.
- Let V_D [resp. V_B] be the set of nodes returning bit-strings [booleans].
- The adversary may set the values of input nodes (but only moving upwards).
- The environment sets the randomness sources.
- The values of other nodes are monotonically computed from their inputs.

Semantic functions

- All yellow nodes are strict.
- Green nodes are monotone boolean operations.
- The value of blue nodes is not \perp only if the incoming control dependency edge carries true.
- The MUX works as follows:
 - If the control dependency is false, or all guards are false, then the result is \perp .
 - Otherwise, if exactly one guard is true, then the result is the corresponding incoming value.
 - Otherwise, the result is \top .


Semantics

- The valuation of the entire graph has the type


$$\left((V_D \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}_{\perp}^*) \times (V_B \longrightarrow \mathbb{B}) \right)^{\top} .$$

- The semantic functions of nodes define a monotone function on graph valuations.
- Its least fixed point is the semantics of the graph.


Computation \leftrightarrow MUX




Application...



Application...



Replication




Representing infinite graphs

- Nodes in different planes, but in the same position are represented by a single node.
 - Such nodes are *one-dimensional*.
- There may be replication inside replication.
 - The corresponding nodes in the representation have more than one dimension.
- In the representation, the edges are equipped with *coordinate mappings*.
- In the representation, the edges generally cannot go from a higher-dimensional node to lower-dimensional node.
 - Exceptions: target node is an *infinite or* or MUX.
 - Then we record which dimensions are contracted.

Arguing about control

- In our experience, the hardest part of the analyser has been the simplification of control dependencies.
 - Meaning: to derive that some node is always false.
- Some simplifications can be done locally.
 - Constant propagation, copy propagation, flattening, etc.
- More interesting ones require the analysis of the whole graph.



- When does $v_1 = \text{true}$ imply $v_2 = \text{true}$?
 - If $v_1 = \dots \& v_2 \& \dots$
 - If $v_2 = \dots \vee v_1 \vee \dots$
 - If $v_1 \Rightarrow v_3$ and $v_3 \Rightarrow v_2$.
 - If $v_2 = w_1 \& \dots \& w_t$ and $v_1 \Rightarrow w_i$ for all i .
 - If $v_1 = w_1 \vee \dots \vee w_t$ and $w_i \Rightarrow v_2$ for all i .
- On the representation, we have to record coordinate equalities, too.
- If $v_1[c_1, \dots, c_k] = \bigvee_{j \in \mathbb{N}} v_2[c_1, \dots, c_k, j]$ then also

$$v_1[c_1, \dots, c_k] \Rightarrow \text{OneOf}(v_2[c_1, \dots, c_k, *]) \quad .$$


Using \Rightarrow

- Simplification of control dependencies.
- If the control dependency of some node u computing $X(\dots, v, \dots)$ implies that the node “ $v \stackrel{?}{=} w$ ” is true then replace u with $X(\dots, \text{Merge}(v, w), \dots)$.
 - In this way we record the equality of values in the graph.
- If the control dependency of some MUX implies the guard of some of its choices, then replace that MUX by that choice.

Independence and randomness

- Consider the ancestors of some node.
 - Move backwards in the dependency graph.
 - Also move from “receive”-s to “send”-s.
 - But not towards the future. (use \Rightarrow)
- If two nodes have non-overlapping sets of ancestors then they are *independent*.
- If at least one of them is random, then they are unequal.
- Typical application:
 - A nonce is generated but never sent out.
 - It is compared with some of the contents of some message received from the network.
 - Then the result must be false.

Our dependency graph...



NOR

- For certain two boolean nodes we can say that at most of them can be true at any moment.
- This can be propagated downwards:
 - If $v_1 \bar{\vee} v_2$ and $v_3 = \dots \& v_2 \& \dots$ then $v_1 \bar{\vee} v_3$.
 - If $v_2 = w_1 \vee \dots \vee w_t$ and $v_1 \bar{\vee} w_i$ for all i then $v_1 \bar{\vee} v_2$.
- Also store coordinate equalities and exceptions to them.
- If we derive $v \bar{\vee} v$ then v is false.

In closing...

- For tracking data dependencies, our representation seems to be ideal.
- Control dependencies are also handled seemingly reasonably.
 - One can consider more or less stringent control flow structures, but the current choice looks like optimal.
- A persistent representation has to be found for data collected for \Rightarrow and NOR.
- So far we have considered only confidentiality properties, but our representation should allow us to also prove integrity properties.