

Securing Class Initialization

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Protecting information confidentiality

Background

Conventional security mechanisms include

- access control
- firewalls
- encryption
- antivirus software

They are useful but not perfect.

Language-based information flow security

Use language-based mechanisms, to enforce that

- software programs manipulate confidential information
- and communicate with the outside,
- while protecting the confidentiality.

Noninterference

The attacker may view nonconfidential (public) information, which must not be affected by confidential (private) data.

A program satisfies **noninterference** if the attacker cannot observe any difference between two executions that differ only in their confidential input.

Explicit vs implicit flows

Explicit flow:

$$l := h$$

Implicit flow:

```

$$h := h \bmod 2;$$

$$l := 0;$$

$$\text{if } h = 0 \text{ then } l := 1 \text{ else skip}$$

```

Covert channels

- Implicit flows
- Termination channels,
 - nontermination
 - exceptions
- Timing channels
- Probabilistic channels
- Resource exhaustion channels
- Power channels
- Class initialization channels

Lazy class initialization

In Java, a class is loaded, linked and initialized **lazily** on demand when the class is actively used for the first time.

Class loading constitutes one of the most compelling features of the Java platform, allowing for dynamically loading software components on the Java platform.

Exception during initialization

```
class C { g = 1 }  
class D { f = 1/C.g }
```

with fields g and f low.

P_0 : $C.g := 0$;
 if $h = 0$ then new D else skip

P_1 : new D ;
 $C.g := 0$;
 if $h = 0$ then new D else skip

Persistence of initialization failure

```
class C { g = 1 }  
class D { f = 1/C.g }
```

with fields g and f low.

P_2 : $C.g := 0$;
 if $h = 0$ then (try new D catch skip) else skip;
 $C.g := 1$;
 new D

P_3 : $C.g := 0$;
 if $h = 0$ then (try new D catch skip) else skip;
 $C.g := 1$;
 try new D ; $l := 1$ catch $l := 0$

Impact of class hierarchy

```
class  $C_0$  {  $g = 1$  }  
class  $D_0$  {  $f = C_0.g++$  }  
class  $D_1$  extends  $D_0$  { }
```

```
 $P_4$  :   new  $C_0$ ;  
        if  $h = 0$  then new  $D_1$  else skip
```

class hierarchy + persistence of initialization failure

```
class  $C_0$  {  $g = 1$  }  
class  $D_0$  {  $f = 1/C_0.g$  }  
class  $D_1$  extends  $D_0$  { }
```

```
 $P_5$  :    $C_0.g := 0$ ;  
        if  $h = 0$  then (try new  $D_1$  catch skip) else skip;  
         $C_0.g := 1$ ;  
        try new  $D_0$ ;  $l := 1$  catch  $l := 0$ 
```

Syntax

$CT \in \text{Class names} \rightarrow \text{Class definitions}$

$\sigma \in \text{Variables} \rightarrow \text{Integers} \cup \text{Class names} \rightarrow \text{Class object}$

Expressions

$e ::= n \mid x \mid e_0 \text{ op } e_1 \mid C.f$

Statements

$s ::= \text{skip} \mid s_0; s_1 \mid x := e \mid C.f := e$
| if e then s_t else s_f
| while e do s_t
| try s_0 catch s_1

Class definitions

$CL ::= \text{class } C \{ f_0 = e_0, \dots, f_k = e_k \}$

Programs

$P ::= (CT, s)$

Class object

$o ::= \{ f_0 = n_0, \dots, f_k = n_k \} \mid \bullet \mid \circ$

Expression evaluation

$$\overline{(\sigma, n) \downarrow (\sigma, n)} \quad \overline{(\sigma, x) \downarrow (\sigma, \sigma(x))}$$

$$\frac{(\sigma, e_0) \downarrow (\sigma', n_0) \quad (\sigma', e_1) \downarrow (\sigma'', n_1) \quad n_0 \text{ op } n_1 = n}{(\sigma, e_0 \text{ op } e_1) \downarrow (\sigma'', n)}$$

$$\frac{(\sigma, e_0) \uparrow \sigma'}{(\sigma, e_0 \text{ op } e_1) \uparrow \sigma'} \quad \frac{(\sigma, e_0) \downarrow (\sigma', n_0) \quad (\sigma', e_1) \uparrow \sigma''}{(\sigma, e_0 \text{ op } e_1) \uparrow \sigma''}$$

$$\frac{(\sigma, e_0) \downarrow (\sigma', n_0) \quad (\sigma', e_1) \downarrow (\sigma'', n_1) \quad n_0 \text{ op } n_1 = \bullet}{(\sigma, e_0 \text{ op } e_1) \uparrow \sigma''}$$

$$\frac{\rho(\sigma, C) \downarrow \sigma'}{(\sigma, C.f) \downarrow (\sigma', \sigma'(C.f))} \quad \frac{\rho(\sigma, C) \uparrow \sigma'}{(\sigma, C.f) \uparrow \sigma'}$$

Operational semantics for statements

$$\frac{(\sigma, e) \downarrow (\sigma', n)}{\langle \sigma, x := e \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma' [x \mapsto n], \text{skip} \rangle}$$

$$\frac{(\sigma, e) \downarrow (\sigma', n) \quad \rho(\sigma', C) \downarrow \sigma''}{\langle \sigma, C.f := e \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma'' [C.f \mapsto n], \text{skip} \rangle}$$

$$\frac{(\sigma, e) \uparrow \sigma'}{\langle \sigma, C.f := e \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', \bullet \rangle} \quad \frac{(\sigma, e) \downarrow (\sigma', n) \quad \rho(\sigma', C) \uparrow \sigma''}{\langle \sigma, C.f := e \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma'', \bullet \rangle}$$

$$\overline{\langle \sigma, \text{skip}; s \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma, s \rangle}$$

$$\frac{\langle \sigma, s_0 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', s'_0 \rangle}{\langle \sigma, s_0; s_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', s'_0; s_1 \rangle} \quad \frac{\langle \sigma, s_0 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', \bullet \rangle}{\langle \sigma, s_0; s_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', \bullet \rangle}$$

$$\frac{(\sigma, e) \downarrow (\sigma', n) \quad n \neq 0}{\langle \sigma, \text{if } e \text{ then } s_t \text{ else } s_f \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', s_t \rangle} \quad \frac{(\sigma, e) \downarrow (\sigma', 0)}{\langle \sigma, \text{if } e \text{ then } s_t \text{ else } s_f \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', s_f \rangle}$$

Operational semantics for statements (2)

$$\frac{(\sigma, e) \downarrow (\sigma', n) \quad n \neq 0}{\langle \sigma, \text{while } e \text{ do } s_t \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', s_t; \text{while } e \text{ do } s_t \rangle}$$
$$\frac{(\sigma, e) \downarrow (\sigma', 0)}{\langle \sigma, \text{while } e \text{ do } s_t \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', \text{skip} \rangle} \quad \frac{}{\langle \sigma, \text{try skip catch } s \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma, \text{skip} \rangle}$$
$$\frac{\langle \sigma, s_0 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', s'_0 \rangle}{\langle \sigma, \text{try } s_0 \text{ catch } s_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', \text{try } s'_0 \text{ catch } s_1 \rangle}$$
$$\frac{\langle \sigma, s_0 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', \bullet \rangle}{\langle \sigma, \text{try } s_0 \text{ catch } s_1 \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', s_1 \rangle}$$
$$\frac{(\sigma, e) \uparrow \sigma'}{\langle \sigma, Q[e] \rangle \rightarrow \langle \sigma', \bullet \rangle}$$

where $Q ::= x := [] \mid \text{if } [] \text{ then } s_t \text{ else } s_f \mid \text{while } [] \text{ do } s_t$

Class initialization

$$\frac{\sigma(C) = \{f_0 = n_0, \dots, f_k = n_k\}}{\rho(\sigma, C) \downarrow \sigma} \quad \frac{\sigma(C) = \bullet}{\rho(C, \sigma) \uparrow \sigma}$$

$$\frac{\sigma(C) = \circ \quad CT(C) = \text{class } C \{f_0 = e_0, \dots, f_k = e_k\} \quad \langle \sigma[C \mapsto \{f_0 = 0, \dots, f_k = 0\}], C.f_0 := e_0; \dots; C.f_k := e_k \rangle \downarrow \sigma'}{\rho(\sigma, C) \downarrow \sigma'}$$

$$\frac{\sigma(C) = \circ \quad CT(C) = \text{class } C \{f_0 = e_0, \dots, f_k = e_k\} \quad \langle \sigma[C \mapsto \{f_0 = 0, \dots, f_k = 0\}], C.f_0 := e_0; \dots; C.f_k := e_k \rangle \uparrow \sigma'}{\rho(C, \sigma) \uparrow \sigma'[C \mapsto \bullet]}$$

Low equivalence on states

Two states σ and σ' are *low-equivalent*, written $\sigma =_{low} \sigma'$, if they agree on low variables and fields and on class objects.

Formally, $\sigma =_{low} \sigma'$ if the following three conditions hold:

- for any x such that $\Gamma(x) = low$, $\sigma(x) = \sigma'(x)$;
- $uninitialized(\sigma) = uninitialized(\sigma')$,
 $initialized(\sigma) = initialized(\sigma')$, and also
 $failed(\sigma) = failed(\sigma')$;
- for any C and f such that $\Gamma(C, f) = low$ and C is in
 $initialized(\sigma)$, $\sigma(C.f) = \sigma'(C.f)$.

Noninterference (termination-sensitive)

Definition

A statement s satisfies termination-sensitive noninterference if, for any low-equivalent states σ_0 and σ_1 , we have

- either, $\langle \sigma_0, s \rangle \downarrow \sigma'_0$ and $\langle \sigma_1, s \rangle \downarrow \sigma'_1$ and $\sigma'_0 =_{low} \sigma'_1$;
- or, $\langle \sigma_0, s \rangle \uparrow \sigma'_0$ and $\langle \sigma_1, s \rangle \uparrow \sigma'_1$ and $\sigma'_0 =_{low} \sigma'_1$;
- or, both diverge.

Noninterference (termination-insensitive)

Definition

A statement s satisfies termination-insensitive noninterference if, for any low-equivalent states σ_0 and σ_1 , $\langle \sigma_0, s \rangle \downarrow \sigma'_0$ and $\langle \sigma_1, s \rangle \downarrow \sigma'_1$ imply $\sigma'_0 =_{low} \sigma'_1$.

- (Relatively) liberal security conditions, which are easy to check.
- Programs satisfying TIN do not reliably leak the secret in polynomial time in the size of the secret.

Magnified leakage

```
 $i := 0;$   
while  $i < n$  do  
   $l_i := 0;$   
  try  $h' := 1/(h \& 2^i); l_i := 1$  catch skip;  
   $i := i + 1$ 
```

Security type system

Idea: no class initialization in high contexts.

$pc \vdash s : \delta_0 \hookrightarrow \delta_1 :: \ell$

- s is typable at pc given any class in δ_0 has been initialized;
- on the successful termination, any class in δ_1 has been initialized;
- it might raise an exception at ℓ .

$pc \vdash e : \delta_0 \hookrightarrow \delta_1 :: \ell$

Typing of expressions for exception handling

$$\frac{\overline{pc \vdash n : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta :: low} \quad \overline{pc \vdash x : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta :: low} \quad \overline{pc \vdash e_0 : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta_0 :: \ell_0} \quad \overline{pc \vdash e_1 : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta_1 :: \ell_1}}{pc \vdash e_0 \text{ op } e_1 : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta_0 \cup \delta_1 :: \ell_0 \sqcup \ell_1 \sqcup \Gamma(e_0) \sqcup \Gamma(e_1)}$$
$$\overline{low \vdash C.f : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta \cup \{C\} :: \Gamma(C)}$$
$$\frac{C \in \delta}{high \vdash C.f : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta :: high}$$

Typing of statements

$$\overline{pc \vdash \text{skip} : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta :: low}$$

$$\frac{pc \vdash e : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: \ell \quad \Gamma(e) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(x) \quad pc \sqsubseteq \Gamma(x)}{pc \vdash x := e : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: \ell}$$

$$\frac{low \vdash e : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: \ell \quad \Gamma(x) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(C.f)}{low \vdash C.f := e : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' \cup \{C\} :: \ell \sqcup \Gamma(C)}$$

$$\frac{C \in \delta \quad high \vdash e : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: \ell \quad \Gamma(x) \sqsubseteq \Gamma(C.f) \quad high \sqsubseteq \Gamma(C.f)}{high \vdash C.f := e : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: high}$$

$$\frac{pc \vdash s_0 : \delta_0 \hookrightarrow \delta_1 :: \ell_0 \quad pc \sqcup \ell_0 \vdash s_1 : \delta_1 \hookrightarrow \delta_2 :: \ell_1}{pc \vdash s_0; s_1 : \delta_0 \hookrightarrow \delta_2 :: \ell_0 \sqcup \ell_1}$$

Typing of statements, cont.

$$\frac{pc \vdash e : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: \ell \quad \Gamma(e) \sqcup \ell \sqcup pc \vdash s_t : \delta' \hookrightarrow \delta_0 :: \ell_0 \quad \Gamma(e) \sqcup \ell \sqcup pc \vdash s_f : \delta' \hookrightarrow \delta_1 :: \ell_1}{pc \vdash \text{if } e \text{ then } s_t \text{ else } s_f : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta_0 \cap \delta_1 :: \ell \sqcup \ell_0 \sqcup \ell_1}$$
$$\frac{pc \vdash e : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: \ell \quad \Gamma(e) \sqcup \ell \sqcup pc \vdash s_t : \delta' \hookrightarrow \delta'' :: \ell'}{pc \vdash \text{while } e \text{ do } s_t : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: \ell \sqcup \ell'}$$
$$\frac{pc \vdash s_0 : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: \ell_0 \quad pc \sqcup \ell_0 \vdash s_1 : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: \ell_1}{pc \vdash \text{try } s_0 \text{ catch } s_1 : \delta \hookrightarrow \delta' :: \ell_1}$$

Soundness

Proposition

If $pc \vdash s : \emptyset \hookrightarrow \delta$ then s satisfies TI noninterference.