

# Building a universal secure computation platform based on protection domains

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
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
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
# Basic scenario



Distributed secure computation system



# Earlier work: Sharemind 2



# How Sharemind works

- » Algorithms for processing data are deployed on the servers.
- » Client applications send in the data and query parameters.
- » The server performs secure computation on the provided data.
- » The server returns the results to the client application who made the query.

# Earlier work: SecreC

```
// SecreC is an algorithm language with
// built-in visibility supertypes private and public
// private values become public through declassify

void main () {                               // main function
    private int a, b, c;                       // private data
    a = b + c;                                 // private computation
    public int d;                               // public data
    d = declassify (a);                       // make private public
    publish (d);                               // send to client
}
```

# Sharemind 3 & SecreC 2

- » We need to be able to quickly adapt new secure computation techniques and security models.
- » These techniques should be easily accessible in the SecreC language.
- » We are updating both the virtual machine and the language.

# Sharemind 3 design goals

- » The virtual computer acts like an *ideal functionality* or a *trusted party*.
- » The computer can support various secure computing technologies.
- » The computer has features for both short-term and long-term storage.
- » The computer can also work with public data.

# Protection domains

A *protection domain* (PD) is a set of data that is protected with the same resources and for which there is a well-defined set of algorithms and protocols for computing on that data while keeping the protection.



# Protection domain kinds

*A protection domain kind* is a set of data representations, algorithms and protocols for storing and computing on protected data.

Each protection domain belongs to a certain protection domain kind. Each protection domain kind can have several protection domains.


# Examples of PD-s

- » An FHE system running under a single key is a protection domain.
- » A single physical MPC instance is a protection domain.
- » A public machine is a protection domain.


# Examples of PD kinds

- » A FHE system specified by its algorithms is a protection domain kind.
- » A MPC system specified by its protocols is a protection domain kind.
- » Public computation systems are a protection domain kind.


# Single node with FHE PDs



# Three nodes with a MPC PD



# Programming the machine



- » The developer writes SecreC code.
- » The resulting assembly code is deployed in the virtual machine.-
- » The virtual machine parses it and stores it in memory as bytecode.

# The low-level machine

- » The basic machine is public.
- » I.e, the program flow is not hidden.
- » It has a stack and registers.
- » Non-public PDs are used through system calls to their implementation.

# SecreC 2 design goals

- » SecreC is a high-level algorithm language for expressing algorithms that process confidential data.
- » It has a type system supporting protection domains.
- » The language is designed for implementing data mining algorithms.



# Example of SecreC 2 code

```
kind additive3p;           // declare PD kind
domain private additive3p; // instance of the PD

void main () {           // main function
    private int a, b, c; // private data
    a = b + c;           // private computation
    public int d;        // public data
    d = declassify (a);  // make private public
    publish (d);         // send to client
}
```

# Writing library functions

```
template<domain T1, domain T2, domain T3>
T1 int [[1]] operator* (T2 int[[1]] x, T3 int[[1]] y)
{
    T1 int [[1]] result (size(x));
    public int i;
    assert(size(x) == size(y));
    for (i = 0; i < size(x); i++) {
        result[i] = x[i] * y[i];
    }
    return result;
}
```

# PD specialization

```
template<domain T1:additive3p>
T1 int [[1]] operator* (T1 int[[1]] x, T1 int[[1]] y)
{
    // make a system call to a special function
    // implemented within the protection domain,
    // passing x and y as parameters
}
```

- » Useful, when a PD implementation has a „hardware-accelerated“ implementation of a certain primitive.

# Future work

- » Sharemind 3 and SecreC 2 will become usable in 2012.
- » We are interested in collaborating to implement new protection domains and protocol suites.
- » We are looking for interesting applications and people interested in developing them.